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from a F.A. Hayek Memorial Lecture prepared for the Austrian
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ibertarians believe that all individuals are entitled
to live as they choose, free from interference by
other persons or by the state. They also believe
that in the absence of such interference, whether by
government or other agents of the state intent on
designing or planning for society as a whole, order will
nonetheless prevail. Given the freedom to contract and
exchange, markets will coordinate the production and
distribution of goods — and indeed do so better than
any other institution can.
It is the first belief that is theoretically distinctive,
and distinguishes libertarians from others, such as free-
market utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham. For libertarians
think that what is most important is to defend the
freedom of individuals to live without being victims of
aggression by others—against their persons, or against
the property they have rightly acquired. Fundamental
to this belief is the idea that all individuals are self-
owners, and that self-ownership carries with it the
freedom to own property.
All individuals must therefore have liberty, but only
that liberty that is consistent with a respect for the
liberty and property of others. This is the basis of the
libertarian account of the justification for, and role of,
the state. If individuals own themselves, and have a right
not be aggressed against by others, no government is
legitimate unless it has the consent of the people. (For
some libertarians, it is then simply a matter of logic to
show by inference that no government is legitimate.)
For those libertarians who think there is a role for
government, its purpose cannot be to improve people,
or attend to their welfare, or satisfy their needs, or give
them what they deserve. At most, its purpose is to pro-
tect individual liberty against invasion by others,
whether at home or from abroad. Otherwise, it should
leave people alone. What could be simpler?
Yet matters may not be quite so straightforward. For
there are at least two very different societies which might
be constructed out of such libertarian first principles.
Which of these is the one that libertarians ought to
prefer? And is either of them wholly acceptable from a
libertarian point of view? To be a libertarian is to attach
especial importance—if not overriding value—to liberty.
Which, if either, of the societies produced by libertarian
principles is acceptable from the standpoint of liberty?
The Federation of Liberty
Let us begin by imagining the first society, called the
Federation of Liberty. In this society it is recognised
that aggression is fundamentally wrong, for ‘no man or
group of men have the right to aggress against the person
or property of anyone else.’ Aggression is recognised to
mean ‘the initiation of the use or threat of physical
violence against the person or property of someone else.’
This society recognises ‘the absolute right to private
property of every man; first, in his own body, and
second, in the previously unused natural resources
which he first transforms by his labour.’ In other words,
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it recognises two central axioms: the right to self-
ownership and the right to ‘homestead’.
Now the world is a diverse place, and people have
different ideas about what is good and about what is right.
The intuition libertarianism as a moral doctrine seeks to
capture is the thought that when people differ in their
ideas about what is good or right it is wrong to try to
force people to accept one version or another, particularly
if they are prepared to go their separate ways. Aggression—
the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence—is
never defensible. The use of force is permissible only in
defence of one’s person or property.
But the world being a diverse place, it will include not
only people who accept the principles of libertarianism
but also those who do not. What should be libertarianism’s
attitude to those who disagree with
libertarian principles? In the Federation of
Liberty the answer is that the principle of
libertarianism should be extended to cover
not simply the treatment of those who
believe in it but the treatment of all persons.
That is to say, it would tolerate in its midst
even those who do not accept the principles
of libertarianism. Such persons are free to
go about their business unimpeded,
provided they do not aggress against others.
If they are numerous enough, they might
form their own communities or groups, and live by their
own lights. If they will not aggress against libertarians,
then libertarians will not aggress against them.
The consequence of this attitude in the Federation of
Liberty might well be that there are quite a few groups or
communities that not only disregard but also directly
repudiate libertarian principles. These may be communities
in which the right to hold private property is not recognised,
or in which the freedom of the individual to dissent from
the community’s powerful authorities is not respected—
or even conceded. Indeed, the freedom of the individual
to leave the community or group may not be accepted, so
that many people are effectively held within the community
against their will. And this is not to mention those who
are kept within these communities in ignorance of any
possibility of leaving for a society in which they might
make use of freedoms they do not enjoy here.
Libertarians, however, can do very little about those
who repudiate libertarianism and work to perpetuate ways
of living that do not respect or value liberty. They may,
for example, attempt to inform or educate those who are
ignorant of their libertarian rights that they do not have
to remain among people who have no regard for them.
But if those who control the communities in which
libertarian rights are dishonoured do not permit this,
libertarians are not at liberty to march in and force them
to allow everyone to listen to the outsiders. Libertarians
might be free to broadcast messages—on Radio Liberty
or on the Libertarian News Network—but cannot demand
that their signals not be blocked or, for that matter, that
the targets of their transmissions be allowed to watch and
listen.
The dilemmas of diversity
If the account so far is right, there could be a great deal of
unfreedom in the Federation of Liberty. The principle of
non-aggression produces a society characterised by a non-
aggression pact among people, some of
whom do, and others of whom do not,
accept the principles of libertarianism.
But such a society might exhibit even
less liberty still. For under this
understanding of libertarianism it is
quite possible, in principle, for the
Federation of Liberty to be made up
of only a minority of persons who
accept the principle of non-aggression,
if a majority of persons live in groups
where aggression within the group is
condoned or unchecked. Indeed it is possible, in principle,
that no one accepts the principles of libertarianism. The
principle of non-aggression operates only between groups
or communities, since no one will use force to intervene
in the activities of those whose actions do not aggress
against them or their property.
But can this really be a libertarian society? One reason
it might be alleged that it is not is that this is a society
that does not so much respect individual rights as uphold
group rights. Yet in the Federation of Liberty there are no
group rights. No community may claim anything from
others on the basis of any group status or collective identity.
Groups have no right even to keep their members within
their borders; and if those who escape from groups they
find oppressive find sanctuary among others outside, no
one is under any obligation to force them to return and
no one has any right that they be returned. Though, equally,
no one may use force to extricate them from communities,
which deprive those persons of liberty, or of the knowledge
that they have rights. Only individuals have rights; groups
do not. Evidently this does not stop groups from having
power; or prevent individuals from becoming powerless.
LIBERAL SOCIETY
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The Federation of
Liberty might end up
being a federation
of not much
liberty at all.
In such a society individuals might not enjoy liberty
for either of two reasons. First, they might not enjoy
freedom because they have no longing for it, having
been raised in their associations or communities with
no knowledge that this is something desirable.1 Some forms
of religious education do this quite well. And we know
that in many societies particular classes of people are raised
to understand that social roles are given by nature. Women,
for example, have in many places been raised to accept
that they were not free to choose the path their lives
must take.
The second reason individuals might not enjoy freedom
in the Federation of Liberty is that they are prevented
from doing so. In such cases, individuals might long for
freedom but might not be able to attain it because they
are forcibly prevented from doing so. Some might be
indentured labourers working to pay off a debt of which
they will never be rid because they have accepted punitive
terms when borrowing.2 Others might have inherited debts
because custom requires that debts be passed on to children.
At the extreme case, people might be
unfree because they are literally enslaved
and slavery is acceptable in the
community—which is a community that
does not believe in libertarian principles.
These people might want to leave—it is
almost certain that they would — but
they are prevented from doing so.
Such unfreedom is possible in the
Federation of Liberty because the practice
of non-aggression is understood to require that people
not intervene in the activities of others except in defence
of their own rights and property. Thus while those whose
liberty has been infringed may be entitled to resist those
who are trying to impede them, no one else may aggress
against those who are violating the rights of others. In any
case, most people are reluctant to get involved with those
parts of the society where liberty is less than completely
enjoyed: free trade with all, but entanglements with none
is the catch-cry that would be heard—except that people
minding their own business usually have no catch-cries.
Now, one way around this problem for the defenders
of the Federation of Liberty as a genuinely libertarian
society would be to point out that an individual
deprived of his liberty or aggressed against can appoint
agents to act on his behalf to protect his rights. These
agents would not be aggressing against a third party
without cause, for they are agents of the principal acting
in self-defence. If this were the case, it would be justified
in the Federation of Liberty for many of those whose rights
have been violated to be rescued from communities or
persons guilty of aggression against others.
This does not resolve the problem of what happens to
those who are unable to appoint agents to act for them.
Even in a world of entrepreneurial would-be agents looking
for principals needing to be freed, such potential agents
have no right to demand that those they suspect of violating
rights allow them to inspect their premises or records.
Nor can they use force to gain access to knowledge of
rights violations, or the wishes of people who might want
to employ their services. Or at least, not in a society like
the Federation of Liberty. For it does not condone the
initiation of the use or threat of physical force against the
person or property of anyone. Yet, perversely, this turns
out to be a society in which many people end up being
free to use force.
The Federation of Liberty might end up being a
federation of not much liberty at all. And from a libertarian
point of view this might be a good reason to reject its
understanding of the principle of non-aggression. Perhaps
the principle of non-aggression
properly understood will give us a
society libertarians can commend; but
that may require a very different
understanding or construction of that
principle.
The Union of Liberty
So let us imagine a second society,
this one going by the name the Union
of Liberty. In this society it is recognised that aggression
is fundamentally wrong, for ‘no man or group of men
have the right to aggress against the person or property of
anyone else.’
Aggression is recognised to mean ‘the initiation of
the use or threat of physical violence against the person
or property of someone else.’ This society recognises
‘the absolute right to private property of every man;
first, in his own body, and second, in the previously
unused natural resources which he first transforms by
his labour.’ In other words, it recognises two central
axioms: the right to self-ownership and the right to
‘homestead’.
Now the world is a diverse place, and people have
different ideas about what is good and about what is
right. The intuition libertarianism as a moral doctrine seeks
to capture is the thought that when people differ in their
ideas about what is good or right it is wrong to try to
force people to accept one version or another, particularly
if they are prepared simply to go their separate ways.
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In the Union of
Liberty people may
not be deprived of
their liberty without
their consent.
Aggression—the initiation of the use or threat of physical
violence—is never defensible. The use of force is
permissible only in defence of one’s person or property.
But the world being a diverse place, it will include not
only people who accept the principles of libertarianism
but also those who do not. What should be libertarianism’s
attitude to those who disagree with libertarian principles?
In the Union of Liberty the answer is that the principle of
libertarianism is not one that people may choose not to
adopt. The principle holds for all persons, in their dealings
with all persons. What is the point,
after all, of a moral principle that does
not apply to all?
But what is the implication of this
for the kind of society that will emerge
out of such a construction of
libertarianism? It ought to be noted
at the outset that it may not mean
that no non-libertarian communities
or associations will exist in such a
society. A crucial dimension to the
rights libertarianism prescribes is the freedom of persons
to waive their rights—or at least, some of their rights.3
Some persons might therefore agree with one another to
form associations in which they live, voluntarily, by non-
libertarian principles. They might agree to hold their
property in common and limit private ownership; and
they might place restrictions on speech, or require all to
abide by strict rules limiting what each may do and
authorising some to hold considerable power over others.
What is different about the Union of Liberty, however, is
that, unlike the Federation of Liberty, no one is permitted
to live without liberty unless he has explicitly relinquished
those particular liberties he lacks.
The difference this makes is a substantial one—more
so than it might at first appear. For in the Union of
Liberty, associations not founded on the consent of the
governed may not operate. This means that certain kinds
of associations or communities cannot exist, for the only
legitimate associations are voluntary associations. In the
Federation of Liberty such communities or associations
had a place insofar as the principle of liberty meant a
prohibition on intervention which allowed such
communities to operate. But in the Union of Liberty the
principle of liberty prohibits the operation of communities
that do not respect the principle of liberty.
In this society, then, it would not be possible, say,
for certain religious groups to operate, since they
effectively repudiate the principle of liberty by denying
their members any right to acquire or hold property,
restricting their freedom to worship, denying them
freedom to move about, and failing to make these
members aware that they have rights to reject their
membership of such a society.
In fact, in the Union of Liberty there could not be any
states or provinces that restricted liberty, say by imposing
tariffs, or prohibiting the use of certain drugs, or mandating
particular educational requirements. The standard of liberty
is a standard that has to hold not only for society as a
whole, but for all the societies within that society. People
may not be deprived of their liberty
without their consent. No authority can
take it upon itself to deny people their
freedom; and any authority that tried
would be subject to censure.
The problem is that there are a great
many communities and associations
which operate without respecting the
principle of liberty, or which violate the
requirement of consent. Most obviously,
parents routinely deprive their children
of liberty, either by requiring some actions or proscribing
others. The younger the children, the greater the
interference with their liberty, and less often their consent
is sought. Some religious or cultural traditions, moreover,
require that children be physically transformed, whether
through forms of genital mutilation or in ritual scarring.
Children are thus subject to a variety of physical treatments,
from footbinding to circumcision, in the interests of their
future welfare.
Similarly, women might be denied the freedom to
seek an education, or non-natives might be forbidden
to own land, or those with particular sexual orientations
might be prohibited from some forms of employment
or from entering into certain contracts. Liberty may be
restricted in many ways and for a great variety of reasons.
In the Union of Liberty, however, such restrictions
cannot be tolerated, for they run counter to the spirit
of liberty which must govern the society as a whole.
Liberty can be given up by those consenting to the
actions of those who choose to deprive them of it. But
it cannot be taken away. And if a free society is to be
preserved, those who would deprive others of liberty must
not be permitted to do so. Liberty must be enforced if a
libertarian society is to prevail.
The dangers of uniformity
The implications of this outlook need to be recognised.
The first, and fundamental, implication is that there
can be only one authoritative understanding of liberty.
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The Union of Liberty
must prescribe what
standards every
community must meet
if it is to pass the
libertarian test.
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While people may in fact have different views about
liberty, only one view of what liberty means and what
liberty demands can provide the standard by which
conduct is judged. Second, and following from this,
there cannot be a multiplicity of authorities with the
right to set standards of conduct. If there were more
than one authority, there could in principle be more
than one understanding of liberty. In the Union of
Liberty, since all societies within that society must
uphold liberty, there must be a single authoritative
understanding of liberty or else the variation in
interpretation of freedom’s meaning could leave liberty
in many places honoured only in name.
A further implication follows from this. The Union of
Liberty is a society in which the principle of non-
aggression—prohibiting the initiation of the use of physical
violence—does not rule out but
endorses intervention by third
parties to end, or avert, aggression
by others. This means it is
permissible to intervene in the
workings of communities or
associations which do not respect
libertarian principles, and whose
members have not waived their
libertarian rights. It will not matter
if the community in question
asserts, through its authorities, that outsiders have no
jurisdiction within its borders or over its members, or
that it is improper for outsiders to aggress against them
when they have not themselves been aggressed against.
For it is enough that the community is held, by the
outsiders, to be not a voluntary association but rather
one in which some members are deprived of their
libertarian rights without their consent.
The implication of this is quite serious. If intervention
in the affairs of people who have not aggressed against
us is permissible—to stop aggression within their own
community—this must be either because anyone may
determine whether or not intervention is justifiable, or
only when it is authorised as lawful to intervene. In the
Union of Liberty, it must be the case that intervention is
permissible only when it is lawful—and authorised as
such—assuming that a libertarian society is a society under
law.
The law in question here cannot be the minimal
rules of confederation that describes the Federation of
Liberty, which permit each community to run its own
affairs—even if in violation of the principles of
libertarianism. For these minimal rules do not permit
intervention—aggression, or the initiation of force—
except in cases of self-defence. But the Union of Liberty
condones, or even mandates, intervention—precisely to
stop aggression, or the initiation of force. Its laws must
therefore reach further, specifying not simply how
communities with different laws must relate to one another,
but what laws every community must have. It must
prescribe, in other words, what standards every community
must meet if it is to pass the libertarian test, for no non-
libertarian community may operate.
Now the implication of this is that there will be a
central judicial body with final authority. For it cannot be
left up to each community to determine whether it meets
the libertarian test—or we would be back to the situation
in which some communities fail to meet the standards of
libertarianism (but simply claim to have done so). This
judicial body will have the
authority to determine when
intervention is permitted to stop
or avert aggression. It will also have
the authority, since there is no
other superior judicial power, to
determine who may rightly
intervene—to stop or avert
aggression.
The problem we face now,
however, is that there is in existence
in the Union of Liberty a strong central authority. This
judicial power will quite possibly—indeed, is more than
likely to—be captured by the most powerful groups or
communities, who will try to influence its
understanding of what libertarian law prescribes, and
its determination of where or with whom the power to
intervene should lie.
The Union of Liberty might turn out, then, to be a
union of not much liberty at all. For it could end up a
union in which a great power ends up being
established—one capable of depriving people of their
wish to live by dissenting moral standards, even if they
are dissenting libertarian moral standards. A libertarian
orthodoxy is still an orthodoxy. And it must be asked
whether any orthodoxy in power is really an ideal of
libertarian construction.
Conclusion
If the reasoning behind these two constructions of
libertarianism is sound, the choice confronting libertarians
is an invidious one. For neither interpretation of the
libertarian first principle produces an outcome which seems
particularly hospitable to liberty. The Federation of Liberty
44 Policy  vol. 17, no. 2
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can, in theory, turn out to contain no communities that
actually value or respect liberty; and even slavery might
have a lawful place within it. The Union of Liberty, on the
other hand, can, in principle turn out to be society
ruled by a strong authority with little respect for
dissenting moral traditions, including some self-styled
libertarian moral traditions. Unless some more
promising construction of libertarianism can be found
to come out of its first principles, it looks as if a choice
is going to have to be made.
Alas, no other construction of libertarianism is
possible. The two alternatives described here occupy
all the available conceptual space; and there is no third
way, theoretically speaking. Libertarians must bite one
bullet or another.
Given this necessity, the Federation of Liberty is
arguably preferable to the Union of Liberty. What
reasons might be advanced in defence of this choice?
The strongest argument available to the Unionist is
that the Federation of Liberty fails to respect liberty
because it will tolerate unfreedom, or even slavery, in
its midst. Such a society can, in principle, be a society
of communities none of which endorses or honours
libertarian principles. For this reason a libertarian
Unionist would argue that a genuinely libertarian
society is one in which libertarian principles are
upheld—or enforced—everywhere. This at least will
ensure that liberty is not extinguished, for aggression
will always be capable of being met by a superior power
with the capacity to protect freedom. Slavery, or other
institutions limiting or dishonouring freedom, would
be prohibited without equivocation.
A Federalist, however, cannot help but look upon
the Unionist’s claims with a measure of scepticism. The
case for the Federalist position is grounded in a
conviction that power ought not to be entrenched.
While authority may be necessary in human
arrangements since disagreements have to be settled,
no power should be established as the final court of
appeal from which no dissent is possible. Indeed, if
anything is fundamental to libertarianism it is the
conviction that dissenters are tolerated or allowed to go
their own way—free to exit from arrangements they
find intolerable themselves. Disagreements should be
addressed through persuasion rather than force. A
federation of societies is a society that respects this
outlook, for while it may contain within it many
authorities, none is pre-eminent, and none may
subordinate the others, or claim a right to control its
members—even if some may exercise enormous power
in fact. What such a society refuses to do is bow to the
temptation to control the abuse of power by creating—
or condoning the creation of—a greater power to enforce
right.
In the end, the establishment of power, even the
power to do good, does not guarantee that good will be
done. For that matter, there is no guarantee that the
Union of Liberty will protect liberty, or even prohibit
slavery. It is worth remarking that the most libertarian
constitution the world has known tried to pretend that
slavery for some was not inconsistent with the ideal of
freedom for all. And the most notable defender of the
idea of a Union of Liberty was prepared to place the
principle of Union above the principle of liberty since
it would rather preserve slavery than see the Union fall.
The choice is not a happy one. But philosophical
choices often are of this nature, since theory frequently
leads us to reductios that are, if not absurd, unhappy
or repugnant. One can only hope that in the real world
such dilemmas will be dissolved in good measure by
civility and good will, even if they cannot be resolved
purely by the power of reason.
Endnotes
1 Of course, many may naturally seek liberty. I do not wish to
deny this. But for the purposes of my argument it is sufficient
to point out that some will not be possessed of a natural longing
for freedom powerful enough to overcome the effects of
socialisation to the contrary.
2 In a sense they might have been forced to do so, since the
monopoly powers granted to lenders in the community leaves
borrowers no option of choosing among competitive interest
rates.
3 As an aside, let me note that some rights may not be waivable.
One may not be entitled to alienate one’s right to liberty such
that one can sell oneself into slavery. The principle of non-
aggression means that no performance of an action can be
compelled, even if performance has been contracted. Though,
of course, the party injured by non-performance may have a
just claim to compensation. This means that anyone selling
himself into slavery cannot alienate his right to break the
contract by refusing to perform as directed, even though he
would have then to compensate the person with whom he
made the contract of ‘slavery’. In effect, this means that slavery
contracts cannot have any force.
